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This paper studies the sensitivity of provision of public inputs to
changes in the speci￿cation of technology and consumer preferences.
We consider a simple model in which the government, with recourse
to three di⁄erent tax settings (a lump-sum tax, a tax on labour and
a tax on economic pro￿t), provides ￿rms with certain productive ser-
vices. We focus on the numerical results coming from the government
optimization problem. We look at several speci￿c cases in which the
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The standard theory of public goods, developed (among others) by Samuel-
son, states that the sum of the marginal bene￿ts coming from one unit of
public spending must be equal to the marginal rate of transformation (of
the public good with respect to a private good). However, from the very
beginning, this rule was partially contested by Pigou (1947), who argued
that the total welfare cost of public spending provision must include not
only its marginal production cost, but also the deadweight loss generated by
distortionary taxation.
The controversy has extended until present dates, specially when the op-
timal level of provision is discussed, instead of focussing on the optimality
rules. Wilson (1991a,b), Chang (2000) and Gaube (2005) are a sample of
such a debate. In general, they provide theoretical arguments and numeri-
cal examples (and counterexamples) in which the usual result is that using
distortionary taxation will open the door to an optimal spending scenario
that falls short of its ￿rst-best level. However, this result is sensible to the
presence of taxed goods which are complements to the public expenditure
(Gaube, 2000, 2007).
Much less attention has received the provision of productivity-enhancing
public expenditures, despite it usually has positive e⁄ects on tax revenues,
which could involve a feedback e⁄ect stimulating the provision of public spen-
ding with distortionary taxation. To the best of our knowledge, with the ex-
ception of Feehan and Matsumoto (2000, 2002) -in terms of optimality rules-
and Mart￿nez and SÆnchez (2010) -in terms of optimal levels of provision- no
previous papers have dealt with the optimal provision of public inputs taking
as reference the Pigou￿ s criticism. Moreover, the sensitivity of the optimal
provision level to consumer preferences, number of taxpayers and returns to
scale in the production function has not been sistematically studied (see, for
instance, Matsumoto (1998) and Colombier and Pickhardt (2005)). Precisely
this issue serves us as a starting point in this paper.
We use a simple model in which a government with recourse to three
di⁄erent tax settings (a lump-sum tax, a tax on labour and a tax on eco-
nomic pro￿t) draws on public funds to provide ￿rms with certain productive
services. We focus on the numerical results coming from the government
optimization problem. With this aim, we look at several speci￿c cases in
which the nature of the returns to scale in the production function emerges
as critical to the conclusions that may be drawn. In fact, only cases involv-
ing the so-called factor-augmenting public input suggest that optimal policy
must collect taxes from sources other than economic rents. Consequently,








distortionary taxation only makes sense when this case is considered.
In this regard, our numerical results show that the ￿rst-best level of pu-
blic input will always be higher than the second-best one. In general, this
result accords with those found for public goods, in which the level reversal
appears to be unusual; and it holds despite the feedback e⁄ect that public in-
puts exert on tax revenues by lowering the marginal cost of provision and thus
potentially encouraging public spending to rise within a second-best frame-
work. Our results also address the impact of changes in output elasticity,
consumer preferences and of changes in the number of households on public
input provision and utility levels. In particular, we observe that a higher
elasticity of production with respect to factor-augmenting public input is
welfare-enhancing, while the opposite is true for the case of ￿rm-augmenting
public input.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section
3 carries out some numerical simulations. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We assume an economy of n identical households whose utility function is
expressed as u(x;l), where x is a private good used as numeraire and l the
labor supply1. Let Y be the total amount of time available, such that h =
Y ￿l denotes the leisure. Economic output derives from labour services and
public input g, according to the aggregate production function F (nl;g):
This function satis￿es the usual assumptions: increasing in its arguments
and strictly concave. Output can be costlessly used as x or g.
Because the labour market is perfectly competitive in this case, the wage
rate ! equals the marginal productivity of labour:
! = FL (nl;g); (1)
where L = nl and ￿rms take g as exogenous. Pro￿ts (if any), which are
entirely taxed away by the government2, may arise and be de￿ned as:
￿ = F (nl;g) ￿ nl!; (2)
We distinguish two di⁄erent tax settings. First, we consider a lump-sum
1The properties of u(x;l) are the standard ones to ensure a well-behaved function:
strictly monotone, quasiconcave and twice di⁄erentiable.
2Pestieau (1976) analyzed how the optimal rule for the provision of public inputs has








tax T so that the representative household faces the following problem:
Max u(x;l) (3)
s:t: : x = !l ￿ T,
which yields the labour supply l(!;!Y ￿ T) and the indirect utility function
V (!;!Y ￿ T). We assume that l! ￿ 0.














The government￿ s optimization problem is expressed as:
Max
R
V (!(g;T);!(g;T)Y ￿ T) (7)
s:t: : g = nR = nT + ￿ (g;T);
where R = T +￿ (g;T)=n is the renevue per person4. An alternative scenario
involves a speci￿c tax on labour ￿. Under this tax setting, the consumer￿ s
optimization problem can be expressed as:
Max u(x;l) (8)
s:t: : x = (! ￿ ￿)l
obtaining l(!N;!Y ) and V (!N;!Y ) where !N = !￿￿ is the net wage rate.





￿g = Fg ￿ (nFLLl! + 1)nlFLg R 0 (10)
￿￿ = (1 ￿ !￿)n
2lFLLl! < 0 (11)
3Note that variables n and Y are exogenously determined. For the sake of simplicity,
hereafter they will not be used as arguments in these functions.













V (!N;!(g;￿)Y ) (12)
s:t: : g = nR = n￿l + ￿ (g;￿),
with R = ￿l + ￿ (g;￿)=n. Under both tax settings and after some manip-
ulations involving the FOCs of both problems and expressions (4)-(6) and
(9)-(11), an important condition for the optimal provision of public inputs is
obtained:
Fg = 1 (13)
According to this condition, the production e⁄ects of the public input must
equal its marginal production cost at the optimal level. This result is con-
sistent with the production-e¢ ciency theorem set forth by Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971).
3 A comparison of public input provision levels
The literature cites a number of approaches mostly used to compare optimal
public goods levels under di⁄erent tax settings. Based on optimality rules
and the relationships of complementarity or substitutability between di⁄erent
private goods, and between private and public goods, Gaube (2000) and
Chang (2000) suggested several criteria for comparing the ￿rst and second-
best levels of public goods. Under an alternative framework, Gronberg and
Liu (2001) relate the sign of the marginal excess burden to level comparisons
of public good provision. But, unfortunately, all these approaches present
a critical drawback in our case: public input does not directly enter utility
function as an argument and thus there is no scope for the translation of
these methologies to the discussion of public input provision.
Alternatively, a standard way of evaluating what happens with the provi-
sion of public inputs under di⁄erent scenarios is to consider speci￿c situations
that can be numerically solved. To this end, and in an attempt to obtain
results as general as possible and which can be usefully related to previous
studies focusing on public goods, we consider three di⁄erent utility functions:
the quasi-linear (Gronberg and Liu, 2001), Cobb-Douglas utility (Atkinson
and Stern, 1974; Wilson, 1991a), and CES utility functions (Wilson, 1991b;
Gaube, 2000). Speci￿cally,
















where a 2 (0;1) and ￿ = 0:5.
The speci￿cation of the production function plays a critical role here,
given that private and public factors may enter into this function in a number
of di⁄erent ways. Of particular importance to the debate is whether the
function exhibits constant returns to scale in public and private inputs (￿rm-
augmenting public input), or only constant returns to the private factors
(factor-augmenting public input). For the sake of simplicity, a Cobb-Douglas
production function will be used in both scenarios.
For each of the above optimization problems, we choose the numeri-
cal method that best suited to the problem￿ s particular features5. There-
fore, we use the well-known Newton-Raphson algorithm to solve the case
of ￿rm-augmenting public input, but choose the standard Nelder-Mead al-
gorithm and the Rational Iterative Multisection (RIM) methods for the
factor-augmenting public input case, since it involves problems with non-
convexities6.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 1 summarizes the optimal values achieved at the benchmark sce-
narios (described below). Panels A and B refer to the cases of the ￿rm and
factor-augmenting, respectively.
Firm-augmenting public input
We assume a production function given by F(nl;g) = (nl)￿g1￿￿, where
￿ 2 (0;1). This speci￿cation creates ￿rm-speci￿c rents. As Pestieau (1976)
proved, if these rents are also an argument in the consumer￿ s indirect utility
function, the ￿rst-best spending condition will not be the optimal one; how-
ever, since our model assumes that all economic rents will be taxed away by
the government, the observation is irrelevant here.
5In an attempt to obtain comparable solutions, the same level of precision, 10￿4, was
demanded of all of them.
6See Kelley (1999) and Mathews and Fink (2004) for further details on Nelder-Mead
algorithm. The RIM method consists of a selective iterative subdivision of the initial
decision variables set, in which the objective function is then evaluated. For a detailed ex-
planation of this method, see SÆnchez and Mart￿nez (2008). Matlab routines implementing








With regard to parameters, we assume that a 2 f0:1;0.5;0:9g , that ￿ 2
f0:6;0:64;0:67;0.7;0:74; 0:77;0:8g for the production function and that n 2
f10;40;70;100;400;700;1000g for population, where the benchmark values
have been emphasized.
INSERT FIGURES 1-4 ABOUT HERE
Figures 1-4 show the main results for several scenarios and each utility
function. The debate over optimal levels of public inputs is irrelevant in
situations where the rents generated by ￿rm-augmenting public input are
completely taxed away by the government. Both the analytical solution
of our model and its numerical resolution give the intuitive result that the
optimal level of productive public spending must be exclusively ￿nanced with
the economic rents. As a result, there is no distinction between distortionary
and lump-sum taxes.
This situation can be compared to that studied by Feehan and Batina
(2007), in which a (semi)public input is treated as a common property re-
source. The appropriate policy instrument in this case is a Lindahl pri-
cing system that charges ￿rms for their use of the public input/resource, in
accordance with the value of its marginal contribution to each ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts
(Sandmo, 1972). All in all, the complete taxation of rents implies to solve
the common problem arising when public input provision is involved.
Beyond the contribution to the optimal levels controversy, these ￿gures
present a number of interesting results. First, for the quasi-linear utility
function the level of public input provision in the production function is non-
monotonically related to its output share (1 ￿ ￿) while for the CES and
Cobb-Douglas utility functions the optimal level is increasing in (1￿￿). The
latter result is easily explained. It can be proven that Fg is decreasing in ￿.
Since a Cobb-Douglas utility implies a ￿xed labor supply, the only way to
hold Fg = 1 is to provide less public input.
Second, all of the utility speci￿cations show a direct link between the
number of households and the level of public inputs. More speci￿cally, public
input and the population increase at the same rate. Since the production
function exhibits a constant return to scale (i.e., it is homogeneous of de-
gree 1), it may be claimed that function ￿ (:) is also homogeneous of degree
1. Accordingly, a rise in the number of households is always followed by a
proportionate rise in pro￿ts (and, consequently, in the provision of public
inputs).
Third, the output share of public inputs (1 ￿ ￿) and the level of utility
are inversely related for all the utility functions. The higher the productivity








situation can be attributed to the decrease in the output share of labour
resulting from constant returns to scale in public and private inputs.
Finally, only for the Cobb-Douglas case, the level of public input rises
as preferences for the private good increase (parameter a). The greater the
preference for the private good, the lower will be the preference for leisure and
consequently the more time will be devoted to work. Under the assumptions
of our model, this situation leads to increase the production and to decrease
the wages, which together serve to increase economic rents7.
Factor-augmenting public input
The main di⁄erence between the above scenario and one involving factor-
augmenting public input lies with the assumptions regarding the returns to
scale in the production function. More speci￿cally, we assume a function
that yields increasing returns on all of the inputs (constant returns on la-
bor): F(nl;g) = nlg￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1). In this context, the debate on the
level of public spending in alternative tax settings again becomes relevant.
Indeed, the use of lump-sum or distorting taxes is necessary here as long
as rents are null. Our parameters in this case are a 2 f0:1;0.5;0:9g, ￿ 2
f0:1;0:14;0:17;0.2;0:24;0:27;0:3g and n 2 f10;40;70;100;400;700;1000g,
again with an emphasis on benchmark values.
INSERT FIGURES 5-9 ABOUT HERE
Figures 5-9 report the levels of utility, public input and labor supply for
each tax setting and each of the three utility functions. Our results accord
with the generalized ￿nding in the literature that a level reversal (a second-
best level of public input over the ￿rst-best one) is unusual.
Other interesting conclusions may also be drawn. First, the level of pro-
vision in the second-best scenario is always increasing in the output share
of public inputs ￿ for the three utility functions. This contrasts with the
￿rm-augmenting case, for which this occured in only two of the three utility
functions. Second, there exists a direct relationship (not necessarily linear)
between the number of households and the level of public inputs. Third,
the level of utility at optimum is increasing in the output share of public
inputs ￿. In other words, the higher the elasticity of output with respect to
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public input, the greater the utility of the representative agent. This result
has a clear policy implication: governments must be aware of the potential
impact on productivity of factor-augmenting public input, since such input
is welfare-enhancing.
4 Concluding remarks
The focus of this paper -the sensivity of provision of public inputs to changes
in speci￿cations under di⁄erent tax settings- remains largely unexplored in
the literature. Previous analyses have focused on the case of public goods
or on the optimal rules for productive public spending. Yet the welfare
implications of taxation and the growth-enhancing potential of public inputs
make this topic a highly relevant one for policy-makers.
In our simple model, public inputs provide productive services to ￿rms
and government has recourse to three alternative tax settings: a lump-sum
tax, a tax on labour, and taxes on economic pro￿ts. In principle, the feedback
e⁄ect, which arises as public inputs encourage the tax bases, might reduce
welfare losses in a distortionary tax setting and, consequently, it may (i)
increase the likelihood of having a second-best level higher than the ￿rst-
best one (it would be an exception in the mainstream of literature on public
good levels comparisons), and (ii) make less evident which the reaction to
changes in the speci￿cation is.
To shed some light on these issues, we have performed a numerical si-
mulation solving the optimization problem of government. With the aim
of obtaining the most general result as possible, we have worked with three
standard utility functions and two types of public inputs (￿rm-augmenting
and factor-augmenting), which involve di⁄erent assumptions on returns to
scale and the role played by rents.
Our ￿rst group of results refers to the case of ￿rm-augmenting public in-
puts. In this case, rents are taxed away by the government precisely because
they su¢ ce to ￿nance the optimal public spending. Under such circums-
tances, we found that the debate on level comparisons under di⁄erent tax
settings is irrelevant. We also obtained a level of public inputs that is lin-
early proportionate to the number of households. The relationship between
the output share of public inputs and their levels of provision is positive in
the case of Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions, but non-monotonic for
quasi-linear preferences.
A second group of results refers to the case involving factor-augmenting
public inputs for which we used appropriate numerical methods to address








spending levels matters in this case, since it describes a situation in which
government ￿nancing comes not from rents but from labor or lump-sum
taxes. Our numerical results are clear and in line with previous studies
regarding public goods: the level of public input in the ￿rst-best scenario
always exceeds that of the second-best one. Moreover, we ￿nd that the op-
timal level of public inputs is increasing in the output share of public inputs
and the number of households. In terms of utility levels, the results for ￿rm
and factor-augmenting public inputs di⁄er from one another. In this sense,
the higher elasticity of production with respect to factor-augmenting public
input, the higher the household￿ s utility, while the relationship is the inverse
for the case of ￿rm-augmenting public input.
Finally, some policy implications can be derived. Shortly, the paper
highlights the critical importance of identifying the returns to scale in pro-
duction functions involving public inputs. On the one hand, only in the
case of the so-called factor-augmenting public input, the optimal policy re-
quire taxation drawn from sources other than economic rents. By contrast,
when ￿rm-augmenting public inputs are considered, comprehensive taxation
of economic rents o⁄ers the best solution to the optimization problem in a
second-best scenario. On the other hand, policymakers must be aware of the
fact that public inputs have a tremendous impact on welfare (with opposite
￿ndings for ￿rm and factor-augmenting public inputs). Therefore, these pu-
blic expenditures a⁄ect not only the production side of the economy, but also
play a signi￿cant role in household utility levels.
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Table 1: Firm-augmenting public input scenarios
Panel A: Firm-augmenting public input
Quasi-linear Cobb-Douglas CES (￿ = 0:5)
n = 100;￿ = 0:7 n = 100;￿ = 0:7;a = 0:5 n = 100;￿ = 0:7
Utility 12.42137 2.04858 34.02809
Public Input 327.20646 214.8877 126.65501
Labour Supply 18.27223 12 7.07281
Pro￿ts 327.20646 214.8877 126.65501
Panel B: Factor-augmenting public input
Quasi-linear Cobb-Douglas CES (￿ = 0:5)
n = 100;￿ = 0:2 n = 100;￿ = 0:2;a = 0:5 n = 100;￿ = 0:2
Utility LS 90.0830 3.0654 109.4471
D 90.0697 3.0584 108.4200
Public LS 2241.3885 1077.6083 1830.5908
Input D 2238.5800 944.6400 1643.5273
Labour LS 23.9543 13.3333 20.3724
supply D 23.9286 12 18.6873




































































































































































































Notes: (1) Newton-Raphson is used to solve these scenarios. (2) Results corresponding to the distorting tax setting
































































































































































































Notes: (1) Newton-Raphson is used to solve these scenarios. (2) Results corresponding to the distorting tax setting








Figure 3: Firm-augmenting (Lump-sum). Cobb-Douglas utility function.


























































































































































































































































































Notes: (1) Newton-Raphson is used to solve these scenarios. (2) Results corresponding to the distorting tax setting








Figure 4: (Cont.) Firm-augmenting (Lump-sum). Cobb-Douglas utility function.































































































































































































































































































Notes: (1) Newton-Raphson is used to solve these scenarios. (2) Results corresponding to the distorting tax setting








Figure 5: Factor-augmenting. Quasi-linear utility function.







































































































































































































Notes: (1) LS = lump-sum, D = Distorting. (2) Nelder-Mead (RIM) is used to solve lump-sum (distorting) scenarios.









Figure 6: Factor-augmenting. CES ( = 0:5) utility function.



































































































































































































Notes: (1) LS = lump-sum, D = Distorting. (2) Nelder-Mead (RIM) is used to solve lump-sum (distorting) scenarios.









Figure 7: Factor-augmenting. Cobb-Douglas utility function. Variable: Utility























































































































































































Notes: (1) LS = lump-sum, D = Distorting. (2) Nelder-Mead is used to solve these scenarios. (3) Dierences are








Figure 8: Factor-augmenting. Cobb-Douglas utility function. Variable: Public input
















































































































































































































Notes: (1) LS = lump-sum, D = Distorting. (2) Nelder-Mead is used to solve these scenarios. (3) Dierences are








Figure 9: Factor-augmenting. Cobb-Douglas utility function. Variable: Labor supply































































































































































































Notes: (1) LS = lump-sum, D = Distorting. (2) Nelder-Mead is used to solve these scenarios. (3) Grey surface helps
to distinguish between positive and negative values.
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